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Summary 
 
Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes 
prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study we investigated whether religious 
priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. 304 participants 
played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were 
subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes, or control 
primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of 
unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants – those who had previously donated 
to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially 
underpinning this effect. The first is a ‘supernatural watcher’ mechanism, whereby 
religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that 
not doing so will anger or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a 
‘behavioural priming’ mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms 
pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those 
norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals 
about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically 
inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their 
adherents. 
 
Key words: Religion; Supernatural Agency; Subliminal Priming; Fairness; 
Punishment; Cooperation. 
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Introduction 
 
The LORD is a jealous God, filled with vengeance and wrath… (Nahum 1:2) 
 
Religion carries formidable epistemic, metabolic and material costs [1-3]. Religious 
believers must maintain and compartmentalize beliefs that are extravagantly at variance 
with intuitive conceptions of reality. Religious rituals, moreover, are often physically 
taxing and painful, and frequently require the sacrifice of precious resources. Given 
such costs, some evolutionary theorists argue that religion must provide, or in the 
ancestral past must have provided, countervailing adaptive benefits [e.g., 1-7; cf. 8-9]. 
Perhaps the most influential of such proposals is that religion is a cultural variant that 
confers a selective advantage at the group level by virtue of the fact that it secures and 
promotes cooperative behaviour within the group [6-7]. This proposal arguably solves 
not one but two thorny evolutionary puzzles: The puzzle of religion and the puzzle of 
human cooperation. 
 
The nature and extent of human cooperation is unique in the animal kingdom [10-11]. 
Human societies are based on large-scale cooperation between genetically unrelated 
individuals. Cooperation is frequent in non-repeated interactions, even when 
reputational gains are small or absent. Cooperation and other prosocial behaviours will 
in many situations be sustained by preferences for fairness, or by a cultural norm of 
fairness [10]. Such preferences are evidenced by the behaviour of participants in 
anonymous, one-shot economic games, many of who nominate fair outcomes even 
when such outcomes are disadvantageous with respect to their material self-interest 
[10,12]. Humans, moreover, reward others who behave fairly and impose sanctions on 
those who fail to do so [10].  
 
One potential means of implementing fairness norms is via culturally postulated 
supernatural agents [9], in particular “full-access strategic agents” such as omnipotent, 
omniscient, moralizing gods [8,13]. Individuals who believe that behavioural norms are 
policed by an all-knowing supernatural agent with the power and inclination to inflict 
terrible retribution for norm violations will have a strong incentive to comply with those 
norms. Some authors, therefore (e.g., 7,14-16], have suggested that belief in supernatural 
punishment confers a selective advantage by promoting prosocial behaviour. 
 
Recent evidence from studies employing priming paradigms is consistent with this 
proposal. In a seminal study, Shariff and Norenzayan [17] used a scrambled sentence 
task to prime religious concepts, and found that participants primed in this fashion gave 
significantly more money in a subsequent (anonymous, one-shot) dictator game than 
did control participants. Similar results have been found in other recent priming studies. 
For example, relative to control participants, participants primed with religious or 
supernatural concepts have been found to cheat less [18-19], to collect more charity 
pamphlets [20], and to be more likely to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game [21]. 
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Religious priming appears to promote prosocial behaviour – but does it also promote 
the costly punishment of unfair behaviour? In the present study we sought to 
investigate this issue. In order to minimise demand characteristics [see 22], we decided 
to present primes subliminally. Our research questions were threefold: 1) Would 
participants primed with the concepts of religion and/or punishment punish more in a 
punishment game? 2) Would such primes influence punishment of unfair behaviours 
only, or punishment of both unfair and fair behaviours? 3) Would any effects of religious 
primes be limited to participants with religious commitments? 
 
Methods 
 
Participants and General Procedure 
The sample comprised 304 participants (140 females, 164 males; Mean age ± SD = 21.9 
years ± 3.7), most of who were students at the University of Zürich or the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zürich. The breakdown of religious affiliations broadly 
mirrored that of Zürich society in general1 and was as follows: approximately 30% 
Protestant, 28% Catholic and 42% other affiliations/no affiliation. Recruitment was 
conducted using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments [ORSEE; 
23]. 
 
The experimental procedure was as follows. Participants were randomly assigned the 
role of either Player A or Player B and played a two-stage punishment game with a 
player of the opposite type. Between the two stages of the game participants underwent 
a subliminal priming episode, and after the completion of the second stage they 
undertook a systematic test of prime visibility. Finally, participants filled out two 
questionnaires – one to collect demographic information (age, gender etc.) and one to 
collect information about religious affiliation, beliefs and practices. Upon completion, 
participants were paid a show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs (CHF) plus their earnings from 
the experiment. 
 
Punishment Game 
We measured punishment using a two-player second party punishment game [24]. This 
game had a two-stage structure. In the first stage, Player A chose an allocation of 
proposed payoffs to herself and Player B. Allocations were presented in points (1 point 
= 0.28 CHF). Two options were presented on the computer screen for Player A to choose 
between: a fair option (150,150) and an unfair option (590,60). In each option the values 
on the left and right indicated the shares of Players A and B respectively. 
 
In the second stage of the game Player B was informed of the two options that were 
available to Player A in the first stage, but did not learn the specific choice that Player A 
made.  Instead, we used the ‘strategy method’ in order to maximize the amount of 
                                                
1 2009 census data: 35% Protestant, 29% Catholic and 36% other affiliations/no affiliation; see 
http://www.statistik.zh.ch/themenportal/themen/daten_detail.php?id=673. 
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statistical data gathered: Player B was, for each option, given the opportunity to spend 
points out of her allocation share in order to reduce Player A’s payoff in that case - i.e., 
to punish Player A. In each case the choice was binding, provided that the relevant 
option was actually chosen by Player A. Previous work has shown that participants’ 
qualitative behavioural patterns are unaffected by the use of this method as opposed to 
the ‘direct-response’ method, in which Player B learns the specific choice made by 
Player A and then chooses a response [25-26]. Player B could spend a maximum of 50 
points (and minimum of 0) to punish Player A, i.e., Players B entered a number between 
0 and 50 for each of the two options. A 1:3 punishment ratio was employed, such that 
each point spent by Player B reduced the payoff of Player A by three points - provided 
that the relevant choice was actually made by Player A. Hence, if Player A chose the 
allocation (xA,xB) and Player B punished her with 0 <= p <= 50 points for that choice, 
Player A’s payoff was xA – 3p and Player B’s payoff was xB – p. 
 
Priming Episode and Visibility Check 
 
The priming episode followed the first stage of the punishment game. There were four 
between-subjects priming treatments: 
 
1) Religion (primes: divine, holy, pious, religious) 
2) Punishment (primes: revenge, punish, penalty, retribution) 
3) Religion-Punishment (primes: divine, revenge, pious, punish) 
4) Control (primes: northeast, acoustic, tractor, carton)2 
 
The priming episode comprised 20 priming trials. The sequence of events for each trial 
was as follows (see Figure 1): fixation point for 500ms, forward mask for 500ms, prime 
for 40ms then backward mask for 500ms. As soon as the priming episode concluded the 
second stage of the punishment game began, and once this stage was complete 
participants underwent a systematic test for prime visibility. We excluded any 
participants who performed significantly above chance on this test. 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
______________________________ 
 
 
Religion Questionnaire 
In addition to requesting religious affiliation, our religion questionnaire included a 
series of items answered on a five-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree; 5=Strongly 
Agree; see Table 1 for a list of these items) followed by a single YES/NO item: “In the 
                                                
2 Primes were presented in German; these are English translations. See Table S1 in the supplementary 
material available online for the German words actually presented. 
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past year, did you donate to a religious organization?” 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
______________________________ 
 
 
Results 
 
We ran separate analyses for two dependent variables: 
 
1. Punishment of the unfair choice (590,60); See Table 2. 
2. Punishment of the fair choice (150,150); See Table 3. 
 
In each case we analysed the actual strength (amount) of punishment rather than simply 
whether punishment occurred or not at any strength. 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
______________________________ 
 
 
There were no significant main effects of our experimental primes on punishment of the 
unfair (Table 2, Model 1) or fair (Table 3, Model 1) choices, although the effect of 
Punishment primes was marginally significant (and positive) for punishment of the 
unfair choice (see coefficient for ‘Punishment Prime’ in Table 2, Model 1). For 
punishment of the unfair choice, however, there was a highly significant interaction 
between religious donations and the Religion priming treatment (see coefficient for 
‘Religious Donations x Rel’ in Table 2, Model 2). Neither religious donations nor 
religious priming had effects in isolation (see respective coefficients for ‘Religious 
Donations’ and ‘Religion Prime’ in Table 2, Model 2), but when both were present they 
jointly increased punishment of the unfair choice by .84 of a standard deviation, p = 
0.0013. Apart from a significant main effect of gender for punishment of the unfair 
choice (see coefficient for ‘Female’ in Table 2, Model 2: in line with previous research, 
females were less punitive; [see, e.g., 27]), no other effects were significant for either 
type of punishment. 
 
                                                
3 Note that the coefficients in our models are in natural units. When we re-analyse with normalized 
continuous variables the coefficient for ‘Religious Donations x Rel’ is .84. 
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Discussion 
 
Humans are subject to strong cultural norms of fairness. A substantial proportion of 
participants in anonymous, one-shot economic games nominate fair outcomes even 
when such outcomes are to their material disadvantage [10,12]. Humans, moreover, 
incur costs to reward others who behave fairly and to impose sanctions on those who 
behave unfairly [11]. Recent studies indicate that priming participants with religious 
concepts promotes prosocial behaviour [e.g., 17,19]. Our aim in the present experiment 
was to investigate whether religious priming would also promote the costly punishment 
of unfair behaviour. 
 
Across all participants, our results indicate a negative answer to this question: There 
was no main effect of religious primes, whether alone or in combination with 
punishment primes, on punishment behaviour. The only suggestion of a main effect for 
priming treatment was for punishment primes alone, which (perhaps unsurprisingly) 
tended to increase punishment of unfair choices. However, religious primes did strongly 
increase the costly punishment of unfair behaviour for a subset of our participants – 
those who had previously donated to a religious organization.  
 
How are we to account for these results? In line with Shariff and Norenzayan [17], we 
consider two possible explanations. The first is that religious primes activate the notion 
that one’s behaviour is observed by a supernatural agent. In this case primed 
participants punish unfair behaviours because they sense that not doing so will damage 
their standing in the eyes of a supernatural agent. Recent studies suggest that even very 
subtle cues that one is being watched, such as stylized eyespots on a computer screen, 
can affect giving behaviour [e.g., 28-29; cf. 30]. Some authors have suggested that such 
cues match the input conditions for evolved mental mechanisms that detect when one’s 
behaviour is observed [28]. Religious primes might likewise function as input for these 
mechanisms [17]. 
 
The second possibility is a behavioural priming explanation, whereby religious primes 
activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion 
behaviour consistent with those norms. This explanation is consistent with evidence 
that the activation of conceptual representations increases the likelihood of behaviours 
consistent with those representations [e.g., 31]. Thus, much as participants walk more 
slowly down a length of corridor when the concept “elderly” is primed [31], priming 
words that are semantically associated with fairness may lead participants to punish 
unfair behaviours simply by virtue of that semantic connection [22]. Bargh et al. [32] 
found that participants primed with cooperation-related words (e.g., fair, share) were 
less selfish in a subsequent resource-management game, and Shariff and Norenzayan 
[17] found that priming with secular-moral words (e.g., court, contract) had a similar 
effect to that of religious primes on fair allocations in a subsequent dictator game. 
 
Although they acknowledge that the two mechanisms above need not be mutually 
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exclusive, Shariff and Norenzayan [17] favour the ‘supernatural watcher’ account (cf. 
22). Norenzayan et al. [33] argue that behavioural priming effects are “typically 
impervious to prior explicit beliefs or attitudes” (p. 532). If this is true, then one would 
not expect the effects of religious primes to be mediated by individual religiosity if those 
effects are attributable to behavioural priming. Norenzayan et al. [33] also describe a 
recent series of studies which found that religious primes caused an increase in public 
self-awareness, which is “characterized by attentiveness to those features of one’s self 
that are presented to others” [34, p. 366] and so directly linked to sensitivity about being 
observed. 
 
Regarding the former point, it seems to us that the effect of activating a certain set of 
cultural norms might well be stronger for those who have internalized those norms. 
With respect to our experiment, it seems plausible that the behavioural norms of 
religious institutions are more strongly represented in the minds of individuals who 
financially support those institutions, and thus more susceptible to activation by 
relevant primes. Nevertheless, we agree with Norenzayan et al. [33] that multiple 
psychological mechanisms may be operative and even mutually reinforcing. If an 
individual believes that in order to avoid punishment herself she needs both to adhere 
to and to uphold cultural norms of fairness, then religious primes may affect 
punishment behaviours both by evoking a sense of being observed and by directly 
activating the relevant norms. Future work might profitably investigate these 
possibilities. 
 
The accounts we have considered above pertain to proximate explanation. In terms of 
ultimate evolutionary explanation, our results are consistent with dual inheritance 
proposals about religion and cooperation.4 A number of authors [e.g., 36-39] have 
suggested that the human proclivity for acquiring and transmitting supernatural agent 
concepts is an incidental byproduct of cognitive mechanisms genetically adapted for 
other purposes. Others [e.g., 33,40-43] have argued that religions are cultural systems 
that exploit such byproducts to adaptive effect. If, as our results indicate, the activation 
of supernatural agent concepts promotes the enforcement of cultural norms of fairness, 
and if such norms sustain cooperative behaviours within the group, then religions that 
harness such concepts will enhance the survival prospects of their vectors, thereby 
contributing to their own survival. 
                                                
4
 Recently, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan [35] documented evidence that university students, 
particularly in Western societies, are frequent outliers on many psychological measures. Given that most 
of our participants were university students in Zürich, a note of caution about the generalisabity of our 
findings is in order. 
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Figure 1: Sequence of events on each priming trial 
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Table 1 
Likert Items from Religion Questionnaire 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.   I often think about God 
2.   I often attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals & christenings) 
3.   I often pray outside of religious services 
4.   I often read or study religious texts outside of religious services 
5.   I believe in God 
6.   I believe in life after death 
7.   I believe God knows everything we do or think 
8.   I believe in heaven 
9.   I believe in hell 
10. I believe God will punish sinners 
11. I believe God will reward believers 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 
Models 1 and 2 for punishment of the unfair choice. Predictor variables include age and a 
dummy variable denoting female gender; a composite of the 11 Likert items from the religion 
questionnaire, representing the average of responses to these items; a dummy variable for 
religious donations; and dummies for the three experimental priming treatments. Each of the 
priming treatment dummy variables is also interacted with the Likert composite and with the 
religious donations dummy. An asterisk indicates significance at the 0.05 level, and two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 0.01 level. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 1   Model 2 
          ______________________    ______________________ 
Variable             Estimate     SE       p value        Estimate    SE     p value 
______________________________________________________________________________   
Intercept              6.966      1.966    < 0.001 **          12.017    7.663   0.118 
Age     ____              0.078     0.261   0.766 
Female                                          ____          -5.248    2.023   0.010 *  
Likert Composite   ____          -1.093    2.112   0.605 
Religious Donations                        ____          -7.054    5.264   0.182 
Religion Prime             -0.170      2.844       0.952       -4.192    7.251   0.564 
Punishment Prime    5.275     2.793       0.060       -5.508    6.808   0.419 
Religion-Punishment Prime 1.960     2.844       0.492       -5.051    7.367   0.494 
Likert Composite x Rel    ____            0.131   3.102   0.966 
Likert Composite x Pun       ____                    3.942   2.784   0.158 
Likert Composite x Rel-Pun   ____              2.566   2.993   0.392 
Religious Donations x Rel   ____          29.394   8.929   0.001 ** 
Religious Donations x Pun     ____             3.377   7.587   0.657 
Religious Donations x Rel-Pun  ____              0.691   7.509   0.927  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Models 1 and 2 for punishment of the fair choice. Predictor variables are as per Table 2. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 1   Model 2 
          ______________________    ______________________ 
Variable             Estimate     SE       p value        Estimate    SE     p value 
______________________________________________________________________________   
Intercept              1.610     1.314       0.222        2.515     5.278   0.634 
Age     ____             -0.094     0.180   0.600 
Female                                          ____          2.309      1.393   0.099 
Likert Composite   ____          0.153      1.454   0.917 
Religious Donations                        ____         -1.643      3.625   0.651 
Religion Prime                   0.760   1.901       0.690            -6.059      4.993   0.226 
Punishment Prime    3.079     1.867       0.100      -0.948      4.689   0.840 
Religion-Punishment Prime 2.131     1.901       0.264       3.129      5.073   0.538 
Likert Composite x Rel    ____          3.020      2.137   0.159 
Likert Composite x Pun       ____                  1.489      1.917   0.438 
Likert Composite x Rel-Pun   ____           -0.165      2.061   0.936 
Religious Donations x Rel   ____         -0.391      6.149   0.949 
Religious Donations x Pun     ____           2.031      5.225   0.698 
Religious Donations x Rel-Pun  ____           -2.190      5.171   0.672 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
